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Lessons from Health Reform
by Trish Riley
As full implementation of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) unfolds, it’s hard not 
to reflect upon Maine’s experiences with 
health reform. Certainly Maine’s Dirigo 
Health reform is a microcosm in this 
sea of change, but a full decade after its 
enactment the similarities are striking. 
Both reforms created subsidized, private 
health insurance, negotiated by an inde-
pendent entity; both expanded Medicaid 
and included strategies to improve quality 
and lower cost; and both met with strong, 
well-organized conservative opposition.
States have long experimented with 
health reform, and in 2003 Maine led the 
next wave, enacting Dirigo Health Reform. 
A campaign promise in John Baldacci’s 
race for governor, it became law his first 
year in office, after considerable work and 
compromise that won strong bipartisan 
support but only by changing the under-
pinnings of the program.
 Always controversial, Dirigo survived 
numerous assaults. Governor Paul LePage 
campaigned to end the program, but 
instead the program continued and 
accepted new enrollees, albeit with 
reduced funding. And, just as Baldacci’s 
bipartisan advisory group recommended, 
Dirigo will sunset on December 31, 2013, 
as enrollees transition to the ACA’s health 
exchange.
A quick review of Dirigo’s accom-
plishments:
•	 Covered	 40,498	 people	 and	 994	
businesses with affordable commer-
cial insurance and annually funded 
MaineCare coverage for about 
6,500 low-income parents.1 
•	 Established	an	independent	agency,	
like Massachusetts and the ACA 
that followed, that negotiated with 
insurers and bargained on behalf 
of members for more affordable 
and quality products.2
•	 Brought	 new	 competition	 to	 the	
market—the nonprofit Harvard 
Pilgrim Health Plan routinely 
ranked best health plan by the 
National Committee for Quality 
Assurance, became the Dirigo 
insurance carrier. 
•	 Responded	 to	 the	 market,	 estab-
lishing a voucher program, helping 
low-wage, part-time workers buy 
their companies’ insurance and 
programs for displaced workers 
and those with pre-existing condi-
tions. Unlike Massachusetts or the 
ACA, Dirigo subsidized  workers 
in small businesses, not just indi-
viduals and families.
•	 Provided	 financial	 incentives	 for	
members to select a primary care 
physician and make appointments 
for wellness visits—a precursor 
to the “medical home” supported 
through the ACA today.
•	 Covered	 preventive	 services	 with	
no co-pays required, a provision 
now part of the ACA. 
•	 Bucked	national	trends	by	reducing	
the number of uninsured in 
Maine, despite the deepest reces-
sion since the Great Depression, 
when employer-sponsored health 
insurance was waning. In 2003, 
America’s Health Rankings listed 
Maine	 18th	 among	 the	 states	
lacking health insurance; in 2011, 
Maine was sixth best in the country.
•	 Linked	 access	 to	 health	 coverage	
with efforts to limit costs and spur 
quality. Dirigo established volun-
tary targets that limited hospital 
costs to a three percent growth rate; 
created a state health plan to guide 
decisions about the health system 
and to limit how much new tech-
nology, equipment and buildings 
Mainers needed and could afford; 
and launched the Maine Quality 
Forum, advocating for high-quality 
health care and helping consumers 
make informed healthcare choices. 
The ACA establishes a new Patient 
Centered Outcomes Research 
Center to improve quality of care 
nationally. Dirigo also limited how 
much insurers could spend on 
marketing, profit and other admin-
istrative expenses, a provision now 
included in the ACA
Despite these accomplishments, Dirigo 
remained controversial. Why? First, the 
reform established public subsidies for 
private coverage, anathema to those 
seeking purely market-based solutions. 
Second, Dirigo’s initial funding strategy, 
including a plan to use significant federal 
Medicaid funds, was not fully imple-
mented. Insurance companies were 
expected to trim their costs, negotiate 
better rates with providers and reduce 
overall cost growth so that a fee assessed on 
insurers could be absorbed by cost savings 
and not passed on to premium payers. 
Today, the Institute of Medicine 
reports that the U.S. wastes $750 billion 
annually in avoidable health care spending. 
In 2003 the public and policymakers were 
not convinced that the system was capable 
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of cost reductions and the insurance 
industry enjoyed strong support among 
key policymakers from both parties. As a 
result, the industry succeeded in allowing 
the fee to be passed on to premium payers. 
The Chamber of Commerce raised 
concerns about the cost of the pass 
through and, with insurers, challenged the 
assessment up to Maine’s Supreme Court 
where it was upheld. But, just as with the 
ACA, a favorable court decision does not 
end controversy.
Each	 year	 the	Dirigo	Health	Agency	
was required to document and prove savings 
in the health care system before collecting 
the assessment. That process was costly and 
contentious; each legislative session saw 
bills	 to	 alter	 or	 repeal	 the	 program.	Even	
bills correcting problems were amended to 
add	language	to	weaken	Dirigo.	The	2008	
legislature enacted new funding for Dirigo, 
a beverage tax, but conservative organiza-
tions launched a successful “no new taxes” 
citizen referendum campaign that rolled 
back the funding.
Like the ACA, Maine built its 
coverage initiative on a Medicaid foun-
dation. Although the original plan to 
use federal Medicaid dollars was revised, 
Dirigo did support the expansion of 
Medicaid to cover parents of Medicaid-
eligible children, using program revenue 
to match federal dollars. And like the 
ACA, Dirigo included reforms intended 
to reduce costs. For example, Dirigo 
proposed a global budget to hold hospitals 
to fixed rates of growth in exchange for 
more authority over how to best deliver 
care. Rather than the fee-for-service system 
that rewards procedures, this proposal 
would pay for good outcomes. Hospitals 
argued, correctly, that they could not be 
held to a global budget unless it included 
physicians and other key players who 
directly influenced health care costs. The 
global budget was replaced with voluntary 
targets and a new law allowed hospi-
tals to work together, free from antitrust 
constraints, to develop systems of care, 
laying a framework for the Accountable 
Care Organization—integrated systems of 
care, supported by the ACA. 
The Dirigo reforms were not all 
successful, but the controversy, like that 
surrounding the ACA, created a chal-
lenging environment. A strong tea-party-
like group declared Dirigo a failure before 
it had a chance to prove its mettle. Much 
of the criticism focused on Dirigo’s enroll-
ment rates, even though the compromises 
that won bipartisan support resulted in 
less funding to meet the original enroll-
ment targets. However, the program failed 
to recalibrate and project new enroll-
ment goals, allowing critics to claim the 
program overpromised. But the program 
continued, thanks to a strong board and 
staff, political leadership and support 
from enrollees.
Several years after Dirigo launched, 
Massachusetts created a similar plan, 
providing subsidies and linking eligible 
individuals to private coverage or Medicaid. 
Why was Massachusetts able to pull off 
their reform—much of which mirrored 
Maine’s—without the controversy Maine 
experienced? First, Massachusetts had 
enacted a law decades earlier that required 
employers to either provide health insur-
ance or pay a fine. Although repealed 
before implementation, it undoubtedly 
provided lessons for the new proposal. 
Second, the Massachusetts plan did not 
include cost-containment proposals as 
Maine did and it won important busi-
ness and provider support.3 A significant, 
longstanding federal payment to supple-
ment Massachusetts’ hospitals was ending. 
Without it, the state’s hospitals would expe-
rience	 a	 budget	 hole	 of	 $385	million—a	
loss that would shift costs to the private 
sector. Massachusetts needed to retain 
those dollars and proposed to do so by rein-
vesting them to subsidize health coverage. 
The state requested and received a waiver 
from federal rules that allowed those funds 
to be used to fuel the reform and save 
hospitals and business from big losses.
So what are the lessons of Dirigo 
Health? 
Separate the facts from the rhetoric:
For Dirigo, the compromises that changed 
and reduced funding were obscured by 
rhetorical attacks. Little attention was 
given to Maine’s benefit design, its highly 
successful system of enrollment and eligi-
bility for subsidies or its still unique ability 
to provide those subsidies to employees 
of small businesses. Similarly, few early 
reports about the ACA discuss successful 
state exchanges—in October half of the ten 
states reporting enrollment were exceeding 
federal enrollment targets.4 Nor do reports 
make clear that the federal government 
had a much bigger job than originally 
intended. Historically states seek flexibility 
and control to run federal programs. In 
the case of the ACA, having so many states 
cede authority to the federal government 
to run the exchange placed a far greater 
demand on the federal apparatus.
Controversy and complexity can be the 
enemy of political will and challenge 
effective implementation:
Elected	 officials	 listen	 to	 the	 drumbeat	
of criticism and, balancing numerous 
demands before them, grow quickly frus-
trated with implementation challenges. 
That leads to calls for oversight and 
change. Attending to those calls requires 
precious time of administrators trying to 
run the program and fuels public percep-
tion about problems without providing 
balance about what may be going right. 
The oversight role is a critical check and 
balance; keeping elected officials engaged 
is essential but not always easy. In Maine, 
some legislators who railed against the 
program and regularly voted against it, in 
practice used the program and accepted 
its subsidies to insure their small busi-
nesses. In the Congress, many of the 
same members who criticized the ACA 
and repeatedly tried to repeal it now raise 
sanctimonious voices decrying the web 
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site delays that keep their constituents 
from getting coverage
Keep going and stay flexible:
Ideological fights will continue, but the 
focus needs to be on the program and the 
facts. Is the web site improving? If not, 
are workarounds in place? Is it increasing 
coverage? Is it affordable? A program as 
significant as the ACA is bound to have 
implementation problems; Medicare 
and Medicaid did, as did the rollout of 
Medicare’s drug benefit. Program imple-
menters need to be flexible to respond 
to problems, and Congressional leaders 
need to allow the time for that to occur.
Expect the criticism to continue:
The rollout of the ACA has been chal-
lenging. The high call and web volume 
facing the new federal exchange may 
not be a good baseline against which to 
measure enrollment, but expect to hear 
the naysayers declare the program a failure 
because it enrolled far fewer than those 
who visited the web site. Of course, when 
the national exchange opened, it wasn’t 
just interested customers who visited. The 
press, researchers, students, and possibly 
people eager to crash the system, logged 
in to the site. 
Medicaid matters:
Some Dirigo funds provided the state 
dollars needed to generate federal matching 
funds. Because of the federal contribution, 
Medicaid was a cost-effective way to serve 
the lowest-income enrollees. The Supreme 
Court ruled that states could not be 
required to expand Medicaid under the 
ACA, but without that program—and its 
shared federal and state financing—the 
ACA cannot reach its goals
Keep your eyes on the prize:
The U.S. spends twice what other devel-
oped nations do for health care, yet we 
leave millions of citizens without coverage 
and get no better health outcomes. The 
ACA is landmark legislation designed to 
redress those problems. To do so requires 
significant change across the health care 
system and for all of us. And change is 
not easy. 
Maine’s Dirigo reform reflects 
the challenge of change and the value 
of moving forward. The controversy 
died down, and the program operated 
smoothly, demonstrating how a subsidy 
program for private health insurance 
can be run. While many in Maine think 
the program ended, it quietly and effec-
tively brought health coverage to nearly 
1,000 Maine businesses and at least 
47,000	 individuals.	 The	 ACA	 deserves	
the opportunity to reach its goals of 
making more people eligible for subsi-
dized health care, supporting innovation 
in how care is delivered and paid for, 
investing in public health and preven-
tion, and beginning a national conver-
sation about how best to achieve a 
high-performing, affordable health care 
system for our nation.  - 
ENDNOTES
1.  Dirigo Health Agency, Oct. 2013.
2.  However, the Dirigo Health Agency, 
poised to become the state’s exchange, 
will be phased out as the state elected to 
have the federal government take on that 
work in Maine.
3.  However, in 2012 Massachusetts enacted 
legislation that will limit the overall 
growth in health care costs to growth in 
the state’s economy.
4.  “The Mixed State of Health Care 
Exchanges,” New York Times (October 
27, 2013). The table also includes the 
District of Columbia, which was not 
meeting enrollment targets, and other 
states not yet reporting enrollment. 
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